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Healer: It is as it says in the song I have written down.  The Sapta Timira 
signify seven forms of benightnedness, of darkness surrounding the 
heart. For you should know that excess stirs up confusion and 
bewilderment, and makes life fruitless…  There are drunk people: 
there are people who get besotted with appearance. Beauty (or 
handsomeness) infatuates them.  Appearance, wealth, ability, 
status, youth, drink, winning (power).  Those are the Seven 
Intoxications. ‘Sapta’ is ‘seven’, just so you know. 
1st person: Don’t joke – and in English too! 
Healer: That’s seven.  What’s timira in English? 
2nd person: It’s darkness. 
From Guna tanpa guna, Hindu Religious Rostrum series performed by 
Sanggar Gintanjali Apgah Denpasar, broadcast  December 28, 1994.1 
 
 
Consumption, in so far as it is meaningful, is a systematic act of the 
manipulation of signs, a total idealist practice...which has no longer anything 
to do (beyond a certain point) with the satisfaction of needs, nor with the 
reality principle... [It is] founded on a lack that is irrepressible’.  
Baudrillard (1988a:22-25) 
 
 
That the silent majority (or the masses) is an imaginary referent does not 
mean they don’t exist.  It means that their representation is no longer 
possible.  The masses are no longer a referent because they no longer belong 
to the order of representation.  They don’t express themselves, they are 
surveyed.  They don’t reflect upon themselves, they are tested...  Now polls, 
tests, the referendum, media are devices which no longer belong to a 
dimension of representations, but to one of simulation.  They no longer have 
a referent in view, but a model. 
Baudrillard (1983a:20) 
 
 
When an individual watches a TV ad he or she is watched by a discourse 
calling itself science but in fact disciplining the consuming subject to the 
ends of rationality and profit. 
 Poster (1990:49) 
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 The masses are increasingly the target of television advertising in Asia.  
Who they are, however, in many countries remains largely unknown.  And what the 
masses think – as opposed to the simulations market research imposes on them – seems 
mostly a matter of supreme indifference to manufacturers and even advertisers.2  In 
Indonesia, for instance, insofar as the masses are presumed to be economic subjects, at 
best they have been imagined as passive subjects, who on a good day are capable of 
applying practical reason to the procuring of selfish ends in pursuit of pleasure.  The 
rest of the time they are bogged down in superstition, communalism and 
hyperconformity (Heryanto 1999).  So there are limits on what needs to be known about 
them.  No sooner is this said than the argument’s implausibility is evident.  Such 
economic rationality is not only a set of a priori, and so universalist, assumptions (von 
Mises 1960), but profoundly rhetorical (Brown 1987; Klamer 1987).  Such assumptions 
are comfortable because they provide an uncomplicated and largely unfalsifiable 
framework for explanation.  It also gives the impression of being able to distance, tame 
and represent the masses (Baudrillard 1983a).  Economic events in Pacific Asia in 1997 
and 1998 should have shown the palpable inadequacy of such models.  So self-
justifying and self-enclosed are these models, and so vested the interests of some in 
defending the status quo, however implausible, that I doubt much will change.  
 This is not to suggest advertisements are not economically important.  On 
the contrary, 
 
If cost is the criterion, ads must be regarded as among the most important 
elements of the economy.  Ads are also in a central structural position in 
the economy, overlapping the means and relations of production.  The 
major problem of the capitalist economy since the 1920s shifted from 
production to consumption...When an individual watches a TV ad the 
health of the economy is at stake. 
Poster (1990:47) 
 
In that case are my remarks about advertising agencies in, say, Indonesia not far from 
the mark?  After all, is not a significant proportion of their budgets spent on market 
research?  Why my scepticism? 
 Audiences and consumers are not however natural objects, but differently 
constituted, as Foucault put it, in different régimes of truth.  Market research researches 
markets – a contested enough notion in itself.  What such research tells us, incidentally, 
about what humans think depends inevitably on the presuppositions of the analysis 
itself.  The ontology of mind and its relation to choice and action is a thorny 
philosophical issue.  So it is hardly surprising that advertisers’ research is prediction-
driven and tends to rely on pre-psychoanalytical, mechanical, behavioural and statistical 
models.  The ends of market research would seem to dictate closure. 
 
The standpoint of market research is limited by the instrumental 
yearnings of the corporations.  The goal of increased profits for the 
corporation actively interferes with the critical analysis of TV ads.  The 
competitive stance of the firm structures the discourse of market research 
  
4
4
into the position of the rational subject: the world appears as a mute 
other that is to be pushed that way or pulled this way.  The only question 
is which configuration of images will do the best job.  The position of 
the firm structures knowledge as a neutral window opening onto a world 
of discrete interacting objects.  The subject remains the desire of the firm 
and science is its procurer.  If the desire of the firm is cancelled, no 
justification remains for discourse to constitute the world as a mechanics 
of interacting objects, as a pullulation of causes and effects.  Knowledge 
as a ratio or table of causes/effects is thus connected to the presumption 
of a rational, autonomous subject, no doubt a male one, a fantasy of 
desire as profit. 
Poster (1990:49) 
 
 There are, of course, other ways of imagining humans as subjects – 
political, religious, historical – just as there are of construing differences according to 
place, race, class, gender, sexual orientation and so forth.  Such constructions remain, 
however, the preserve of an élite, be it political, economic, media-based or academic.  
The objects of these accounts – the masses, ordinary people, you and I when we watch 
television – are mostly presumed to be passive subjects (Hobart 1997a).  Such subjects 
are capable of responding to laws, orders, exhortations, enticements, advertisements, 
but either they are unable to reflect critically on the conditions under which they live or, 
if they do, it is a matter of little importance.   
 In this chapter I wish to consider what a number of Balinese villagers had to 
say about their engagement with advertising.  I shall argue the strong case that, in Bali, 
people who see themselves as poor (Sang Tiwas), insignificant little people (wong alit) 
and part of the masses (rakyat) have an understanding of what is going on, what we 
might call ‘implicit theory’, which differs from, but in ways is at least as important as, 
that of their lords and masters, academic experts and others.  What is more, this 
understanding suggests different and subtle ways of understanding how advertising 
works and how people are implicated in contemporary mass media. 
 My suggestion that Balinese intellectual practices should be treated 
seriously in their own right and even juxtaposed critically to the monolith of scientific 
knowledge on occasion elicits howls of indignant outrage.3  So let me outline what I am 
trying to say and what not. I am not proposing some romantic return to a pure and 
original native knowledge (see Hobart 1993).4  It never existed  We need, though, to 
distinguish natural scientists’ necessarily extrapolated and textualized accounts of their 
theoretical worlds from their scientific practice and its consequences (Feyerabend 1975, 
1987).  Anyway, as Foucault pointed out (1972; and even Habermas largely accepts, 
1987) the human sciences face the rather different problem that human beings are at 
once the subjects and the objects of their own knowledge.  The result is a potentially 
vicious inflationary spiral of ungroundable knowledge, exemplified by the rapid 
expansion of the human sciences.  Without independent conditions of judgement, 
analysis depends upon the critical evaluation of the presuppositions and implications of 
the approaches in use.  If Quine was forced to admit that there were no epistemological 
grounds to choose between Homer’s gods and atoms (much though he preferred the 
latter [Quine 1953:44]), why the thinking subject-matter of the human sciences should 
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be excluded from having a rôle in explanation is unclear.  That is not to imply that they 
meet on equal terms.  Far from it.  Natural scientific knowledge especially is 
hegemonic.  My interest is in the practices through which it is articulated – the outrage 
that questioning evokes being itself arguably a defensive articulation.5 
 As introducing the notion of articulation (see Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 
Laclau 1990; Hall 1996; Slack 1996) suggests, I wish to shift discussion away from 
what Bakhtin called the ‘theoretism’ of much human scientific thought to reconsider our 
uses of theory as a set of intellectual practices which produce and reproduce knowledge 
itself (see Hobart 1996).  Reviewed in these terms, the intellectual practices of 
academics, market researchers and the people being studied necessarily overlap, engage 
with and affect one another.6  Knowing as a situated act is a relatively minor theme in 
western philosophy, which has remained in thrawl to visual or spatial metaphors of 
knowledge (Rorty 1980; Salmond 1982).  Indian philosophers, however, have taken the 
issue seriously.  As Matilal noted, in Nyaya philosophy, knowing is a process which: 
 
Is set in motion by doubt and ends in a decision …  The end-product 
takes the form of a mental episode called prama, ‘knowledge’ (a 
knowledge-episode).  It is such a cognitive episode (jñana) as hits the 
mark! … Indian philosophers viewed a world or constructed a world of a 
series of cognitive events rather than collected a mass of true 
propositions. 
Matilal (1986:100, 105-6) 
 
As Balinese have been for close on a millenium part of this philosophical discourse, it 
would seem force majeur or plain ethnocentric to declare them unqualified in principle 
from commenting on their own thought.  That this involves a counter-articulation to the 
prevailing hegemony should not worry critical thinkers, though it may well upset pillars 
of the ancien régime. 
 
 
Background 
 
Because I shall let a number of Balinese speak reflectively about themselves at some 
length, in order to appreciate what they were saying, I need to sketch in some 
theoretical and ethnographic background. 
 Of the approaches to consumption and consumerism, despite his tendency 
to over-generalize his arguments, I find the work of Baudrillard the most stimulating 
and perceptive.  Perhaps it is significant that his key work, La Société de Consommation 
took twenty-eight years to be translated (1998).7  On advertising, I am still feeling my 
way.  On television and mass media, working in a Balinese village, where issues of 
audiences looms large, my starting position is with the work of critical media scholars 
like Ien Ang (1991, 1996) and David Morley (1992).  The conclusion to their arguments 
is the importance of ethnography. I would argue further, though, that it also involves the 
inclusion of the objects of inquiry as agents, whose reflection on their lives is the 
condition of changing them, not just as patient subjects of others’ knowledge.  If the 
slogan ‘media practices’ is not to be vapid, a new kind of critical ethnography is 
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required which includes people’s appreciation of the circumstances of their own 
practices.8  Much has been written on the human subject in media, especially film, 
studies.  I am disturbed by the ethnocentric nature of much of this theorizing, Lacanian 
or otherwise; as I am by the continued exclusion from those analyses of those whose 
thought and lives we take it upon ourselves to study. I hope that what follows will make 
it clear that they are abundantly qualified to participate.  Following John Hartley (1992), 
I take it that good practice in media studies is of necessity interventionist.  Impressive as 
it may sound, scientific neutrality here is a disingenuous posture that has unacceptable 
implications.9 
 The conversations on which this paper is based took place in August 1997 
in the highland Balinese village where I have worked since 1970.  They were part of a 
long series of discussions during my annual visits, since I became interested in 1990 in 
the mass media in Indonesia.  This interest was sparked by Balinese themselves, who 
pointed out to me that the spread of television was having an enormous impact on their 
lives, more significant than tourism or the government’s development policies.  By the 
late 1980s, public life around coffee and food shops in the village square, to which 
people had previously repaired after work in the rice fields and in the evening, had 
largely ceased.  People, including teenagers, mostly preferred to stay at home and watch 
TV.  This affected my research, because villagers rarely ambled round any more for a 
drink and a chat as they had in the past.  When I caught up with them, usually watching 
television, they would often muse about its impact, because television was a topic of 
increasing concern, the implications of advertising being high on the list (Hobart 1999, 
2000). 
 Almost every household in the village where I work (which is neither 
particularly affluent nor poor by Balinese standards) now has at least one radio and a 
television set.  Poorer families own black-and-white sets which receive only the state 
television channel (TVRI), but more people now own colour sets which can also receive 
five terrestrial commercial channels, as well as over twelve satellite stations (although 
only one family has yet bought a dish in the settlement itself).  Such sets cost over half a 
million Rupiah in 1997 before the monetary crisis (US $200 or more, and the dishes 
$500).  Quite how the less well-off pay for these is a question which exercises local 
Balinese themselves.  Much work, whether carving, sanding and painting statues, or 
making offerings and cooking, is compatible with watching, or at least listening to, 
television which, in most households, is on from morning to late at night. 
 The conversations, from which extracts follow, are part of my work in 
progress on television as a social practice in Bali.  The mass media are part of a 
congeries of practices, many if not most of which happen when the television set is not 
even on, be it cooking in time to watch a TV programme, saving to buy a video recorder 
or buying a product as seen on TV.  I live with an extended family and spend much time 
watching television with them, and watching and listening to them while they do so.  
The relevant members of the family are as follows.  The head, Ktut Sutatemaja, aged 
about 60 at the time of writing, is my main research assistant.  He was a long-distance 
truck driver, actor and later became village head responsible for customary and 
religious matters.  His wife, Mèn Sinduk, in her early 50s, runs a general shop.  Her 
daughter, Ni Sinduk, in her late 20s, at her mother’s urging married Ktut Sutatemaja’s 
eldest son (by a different marriage, but they are notionally brother and sister).  She 
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recently completed a degree at the Academy of Performing Arts in the provincial capital 
and is an accomplished actress-dancer.  Her husband, Wayan Suardana, is a secondary 
school teacher and does most of the work on a project to record Balinese television 
programmes, which I started in 1990.10  Mèn Sinduk’s recently widowed mother, who 
spent every day as a petty trader in the market, had also moved in.   
 In a pavilion, conveniently near the kitchen for the women, is the television 
set.  It is turned on during the day if someone has leisure time, and almost every 
evening from about 7 p.m. is the focus of family life until they go to bed one by one.  
Until July 1997, they had made do with a black and white set, which could only receive 
state television (TVRI).  Few people, however, watch this channel.  If they cannot 
afford colour sets, which receive five commercial channels with a far more varied and 
glossy fare, they often go round to the neighbours who have.  When I presented the 
family with the old 21 inch Sony set used by the Television Project, its effect on family 
life was immediate.  The adolescent boy in the family now stays in most evenings; 
television is on much of the day; members of the family do work when possible while 
watching; and the women in particular watch much more than they did.  The 
advertisements are a favourite, not least as a topic of conversation.  No family I have 
seen watches television in silence: it is an interactive occasion. 
 In the conversations about advertising excerpted below, the household head 
was always present; and his daughter-in-law usually was, because she was quite 
interested in talking about television and the other topics we tended to discuss.  Other 
family members dropped in and out.  Two other key figures were also often present.  
One was an old actor in his early 90s, ‘Gung ‘Kak, a minor scion of the local court, and 
a great deal clearer in mind despite his age than I often am.  The other, Déwa Pekak, 
was a wealthy high caste farmer and lover of shadow theatre and conversation.  I have 
worked with both on and off for many years.  The elderly actor in particular is an old 
friend of the ex-headman and they frequently have conversations when I am not there 
about much the same issues which we discuss.  I recorded four discussions about 
advertising in all in the summer of 1997.11  Each was fascinating; but I deal largely with 
the first as it was that which took the most reflective turn.  Feminists might well argue 
that this was because of the dominance of elderly males.  If you look at the transcripts 
carefully, this underestimates the role of the young woman.12  I would suggest the 
quality of the argument has more to do with the fact that three of the main people were, 
or had been, actors.  And actors, rather than, say, priests, are still the traditional 
intellectuals in Bali. 
 As far as I can judge, the conversations on which the research is based are 
extensions of discussion that takes place on various occasions, rather than radically 
different kinds of activity.  There are, however, important differences.  These 
discussions have an interrogative twist: I ask questions in a way Balinese would often 
not.  By virtue of my being an academic, my presence there as part of research, often 
with a cassette recorder, provided a direction at moments to conversations that they 
would probably not have otherwise.  I say ‘at moments’ because, despite leaving a tape 
recorder running, the speakers often gave every appearance of ignoring me.  (This is 
less obvious in the extracts chosen here, because I have selected moments when they 
were addressing my questions to them).  It is a matter of degree.  On their own account, 
when you spend so much time chatting in a group, issues of status diminish, although 
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they do not disappear.  I would suggest that they are unlikely to disappear for the 
family, who earn a significant proportion of their total income from the Television 
Project, even if that is largely unconnected with my day-to-day research.  Finally, by 
showing interest and asking questions about television, the people I work with, at least 
intermittently, think about television in different ways in their lives.  
 The idea though that there is some pure, authentic ‘response’ to television 
advertisements, some state of being which transcends practices of viewing is a utopian 
fantasy.13  On the other hand, the idea that there is a ‘dirty’ response in terms of how 
many units are sold per broadcast is equally fanciful.  For practical, as well as 
theoretical reasons, you can never know why.  No matter how ardently advertisers or 
media studies specialists might wish it, there can be no generalized account of Balinese, 
Indonesian – or anyone else’s – response to television or to advertisements (see Ang 
1991).  It is to precisely these issues that I now turn. 
 
 
Caveat Spectator 
 
Over the years several themes often came up in conversation.  Villagers were acutely 
sensitive to the differences of power between ordinary viewers and metropolitan élites.  
The latter are widely presumed to organize deals among themselves.  So even the 
scheduling is a form of advertising for those with connections or cash.  How 
programmes promoted lifestyles, and advertisements sold goods to people who often 
did not really want to buy them, was a constant theme.  Explanations ranged from 
situated worlds (if you stand near a waterspout you get splashed) to theories of imitation 
(cf. Smith 1995).14  A favourite was telling stories against yourself about how you had 
been fooled into buying some product you saw advertised on television.15  That in itself 
is an interesting comment on how poorer Balinese saw themselves implicated in 
advertising practices. 
 Earlier on the evening of the first conversation, we were watching television 
when there was an advertisement was for a refrigerator, which I found rather unoriginal 
and ignored until my host became excited and remarked how clever the presenter was.  
Later I asked about it. 
 
 
Self: You were just talking about the fridge advertisement.  Can you 
explain it again?  I’m not sure I really understand. 
Ex-head:  It’s about what’s said in the fridge Ad, the one who speaks – what’s 
his name?  The one in the SiDoel films who plays Kong Aji.  (SiDoel 
Anak is a series which has the highest audience ratings in Indonesia.  
It is one of the few about ordinary people’s lives.)  Now he’s talking 
about the fridge.  ‘Hah! Now this is good.  It holds a lot and is 
economical on electricity’.  Now, after that it goes: ‘New, durable!’ 
Self: Hmm. 
Ex-head: Now the presenter is clever. 
Old Actor: Hah! 
Actress: Emerald, Emerald.  That’s the brand name. 
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Ex-head:  What? 
Actress: Emerald. 
Ex-head: Well, Emerald or whatever.  That’s understood.  As long as goods are 
new, of course they’re good.  But, after a few months, a few years, 
what then? 
Old Actor: There’s a time limit, of course. 
Ex-head: The presenter is consummate; what he says is ingenious.  It’s so he 
can’t be attacked by those who buy it.  If, after three months, it breaks 
down, can the purchaser hold him responsible for saying it’s durable?  
That’s smart, that is. 
Old Actor: That’s someone who’s good at being ambiguous. 
Ex-head: Using ‘Hey!  New durable!’  It’s funny; it’s articulate. 
Old Actor: A clever person, who also has a silver tongue. 
 
While much of what the participants said I had heard in some form in other 
conversations, it was not chance, I think, that this one was only picked up by viewers 
who had themselves been actors.  It is the art of being careful, or deliberately 
ambiguous, in your choice of words to convey one impression, but say something 
different, which is appreciated by the more discerning, more mature listeners.  Such 
mature speech, raos wayah, is much used in public fora and, of course, in theatre.  
There was appreciative recognition of a Javanese, fellow professional.  The presenter 
had managed to square his obligations to the advertising agency which hired him and to 
the more discerning among the viewers to whom he was supposed to sell the fridges.  If 
people chose not to think about what they heard, that was their problem.  
 
 
Selling Words, Not Images 
 
As the discussion continued about how words were used to persuade, I interjected that 
surely it was the images – the endless procession of desirable looking commodities – 
which is what made advertisements really enticing. 
 
Self: It isn’t just in words that television advertisements promote their 
goods.  There are images.  There are pictures. 
Ex-head: It’s showing what the items are like, to inform people who don’t 
know about them. 
Old Actor: About the products. 
Ex-head: In (advertising) literature, for example, you have to specify what it is 
that you are talking about.  That is so that people know about the 
goods in question, that according to the ad they are good. 
Self: If so, the purpose of advertisements is so you will know about the 
product in question? 
Ex-head You are only able to know about it.  It’s just an image.  You do not 
yet know it, what it is really made of, what its real worth is.  You just 
know about the image… 
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This line of argument surprised me initially, I think because I had slipped into what is at 
least my idea of British media priorities, namely images over text.  It might seem that 
the downplaying of images was because, as stage actors, they depended on the word.  
However, during the opening scene of a popular drama performance by perhaps Bali’s 
best-known troupe in March-April 1991, one performer had slapped down his long-time 
partner for stating as a fact what he had seen on television.  He was reminded sharply 
that it was just an image, lawat, the same term the ex-headman used.  Nor is it the case 
that Balinese, or at least the actors, eschew images for words, which would be rather 
odd in a society famed for its visual sensitivity and panache.  This time, though, the 
commentators were saying what is widely held to be so.  In Bali ‘wysiwyg’ is ‘wysiwys’: 
what you see is what you see, not what you get.  There is a more serious point here.  
Images are suggestive, but you tend to need words to tell you the significance of what 
you have seen. 
 
 
Selling Words, Not Goods 
 
The conversation continued with me still confusing image and reality, and being 
corrected again.  (Ethnography is largely a battle by the people you work with to 
overcome the analyst’s ethnocentric and professional prejudices.  If you are lucky, they 
win – sometimes). 
 
 
Self: Now, if I understand advertisements on television, they show a 
comfortable existence – the good life – so people will want a lifestyle 
like that? 
Ex-head: They don’t show the good life.  What they show - better what they put 
forward – is an existence they say is good.  But that is not yet for sure.
Old Actor: What’s good. 
Ex-head: Yes.  Is it actually good – is it really like it is presented – or not? 
Old Actor: That’s so. 
Ex-head:  Now, I’m speaking from what I’ve heard, I don’t know it personally.  
I’ve just heard word.  Don’t believe what you see, because you’ve 
never tried it.  But, as to the products, the advertisements will make 
all sorts of claims about them.  The sort of person who buys is the sort 
of person who has no need to make their money work any more, isn’t 
that so ‘Gung ‘Kak? ‘Hey! Let’s just buy one.  The ad said they were 
marvellous’.  Huh.  That sort of person. 
Old Actor: They’ve never bought one before. 
Ex-head: In other words, buy something to try it out. 
Old Actor: As I said.  Never bought one, let’s have a trial… 
Ex-head:  Now, if I think about it, if a patent medicine-seller turns up: ‘This 
medicine, that medicine.  (In other words, whatever its name is, it 
cures lots of diseases).  Rub your eyes, they disappear.16  However, in 
fact what you’re selling is the words.  You aren’t really selling the 
goods if you are a patent medicine-seller.  People say they sell speech.
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Old Actor: It’s generally known that.  Of course what medicine-sellers trade in is 
sounds. 
Self: Is there a point to what they say? 
Ex-head: Just a lot of hot air.  There’s nothing of substance. 
Old Actor: Nothing at all. 
 
The commentators make the point that beautiful images and elegant lifestyles do not 
speak for themselves.  They require mediation.  (Note that mediation here is not 
instantiation, as if often assumed in Cartesian and idealist models).  The remark about 
‘the sort of person who has no need to make their money work any more’ is interesting.  
The ex-headman is neither an economist nor a businessman.  In fact he has six years of 
elementary school education.  It is more a comment on contemporary Balinese society, 
where rocketing land prices accompanied and enabled a spectacular boom in 
consumption unrelated, as many Indonesians are finding out at the time of writing, to 
the conditions for balanced economic growth.  While a conspicuous set of people, right 
out to the remoter villages, was selling land and other assets to be able to buy the 
widely-available consumer items, a much smaller group was gravely concerned about 
the consequences.17 
 As usual in conversations in many places, it is what is not said that is as 
important as what is.  Here the unstated theme is: what sort of state have you to be in to 
try something out for the hell of it?  And what sort of person must you be to indulge in 
such wasteful consumption when others around you are near starvation?  Hence the 
repeated reference to ‘the sort of person (who)’.  As the context makes clear, they are 
the sort of people who either cannot, or no longer, bother to distinguish the image from 
the reality, or who are so besotted they need to buy something simply because it is 
there.  In short, they are benighted, intoxicated.  There is a close parallel between 
Balinese and English, peteng being ‘night’, so that kapetengan is literally ‘benighted’.  
In contemporary Balinese usage, seven kinds of intoxication are recognized (see 
below), only one of which refers to strong drink, drugs and so on.  It is a far broader, 
and more interesting, category. 
 The whole analysis rests not upon ever more dazzling exegeses about the 
ultimate nature of the image, of the media, of the umpteenth late capitalism, but upon a 
recognition of human proclivities, as known by people in the village.  By contrast to the 
largely mechanical models of the subject in market research, Balinese discourse treats 
the subject explicitly as a site of transformative processes, triguna (see below).  Is there 
much difference in falling for the wonderful claims made for patent medicines and for 
television advertisements?  Then comes the twist.  Images are imaginary.  What you are 
actually buying is not what the salesman’s patter was about, but the words themselves 
in all their insubstantiality and seductiveness.  Having ploughed through tedious tomes 
on theories of consumption, am I alone in finding a deftness, an analytical sharpness, a 
sense of history and irony in the Balinese conversations which the former mostly lack? 
 Something more general is at issue here.  My companions were engaged in 
a disquisition on seduction.  As Baudrillard has argued at length, seduction both 
undermines and refuses the inscription and hypostatization of the discourse of 
production, which indefatigably strives, and fails, to negate the workings of seduction.  
The paradoxes, fantasies and elusiveness of desire, what motivates particular humans on 
  
12
12
particular occasions, make a different sense within the twists and turns of dialogic 
interaction than when laid out on the slab of hypothetico-deductive thought.18  It is in 
this sense that Balinese thinking requires attention, not in the forlorn hope that they will 
write the ultimate treatise on human nature which, as Collingwood (1945) noted of 
Hume’s attempt (1739), is an impossibility because the notion is indissolubly linked 
with reflective human interaction and so is dialogic. 
 
 
The End of Advertisements 
 
The next step raises a practical point, which turns out to be a rather subtle issue in 
pragmatism. 
 
Ex-head: No one ever advertises things which are really first class. 
Old Actor: Ah! It’s true, they don’t.  But why not? Some ads have great lines, but 
it’s far from certain the product is any good. 
Actress: It’s like Dad says, if the product is really good, then you don’t need to 
advertise it, like Sony products.  There are never any ads on television 
for them. 
Old Actor: Of course, everyone knows that. 
Actress: Everyone knows if goods are really good. 
Ex-head: There is no way of knowing if the product is any good from 
advertisements.  The cost of hiring people to make ads is extremely 
expensive, ‘Gung ‘Kak. 
Old Actor: Hiring them? 
Actress: It’s very costly.  They say you have to pay them for every time it’s 
broadcast. 
Ex-head:  How much for so many people? You get very rich through doing ads; 
you earn an enormous amount.  So you have to stick your neck out 
and pay god knows how much to run an advertisement.  Instead, why 
not give out samples for everyone to try? If the product were really 
good, they’d hand them out on request.  That would really help. 
Old Actor: In other words, people would promote them by passing on the word. 
 
This is by no means the end.  If it is insubstantiality and seductiveness, exemplified in 
the word and the image, which you are buying, then the divorce of the sign from the 
object is not only complete, but the sign becomes its own reality.  Without post-
structuralist academic credentials, the commentators have reached a related position to 
Baudrillard’s famous rescension of Foucault’s The Order of Things. 
 
This would be the successive phases of the image: 
- it is the reflection of a basic reality 
- it masks and perverts a basic reality 
- it masks the absence of a basic reality  
- it bears no relation to any reality whatever: it is its own pure 
simulacrum.   (1983b:11) 
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Whereas Baudrillard retired into unsituated abstraction with his image of the image, the 
commentators are capable of coping with a heterogeneous reality.19  Not all 
representations are simulacra: that would be too easy.  The problem is that the different 
phases of the image co-exist.  The good products sell partly because they are not 
simulacra.  The seduction of the image is its own limiting condition.  There is also the 
seduction of the real, which succeeds because it proves to be on the whole what critical 
investigation said it was, in this instance Sony television sets.  To achieve his effect, 
Baudrillard has to ignore his own analysis of seduction by creating a new grand 
narrative of the image and seduction.  For Balinese, if something works, people tell one 
another. 20 
 Baudrillard argued, rather cogently, that in the world of mass media there 
are two orders: ‘an operational system which is statistical, information-based and 
simulational’ and a ‘system of representation’ based upon a ‘philosophy of the subject: 
will, representation, choice, liberty, deliberation, knowledge and desire’ (1988a:209, 
214).  Instead, however, of pitching one against the other to produce at best an 
interminable stand-off, at worst a vicious vortex, in their conversation the Balinese, 
recognizing these possibilities, pointed to a route out of the academicism.  The 
recognition of reality, statistical or subjective, depends as C.S. Peirce (1984) and the 
commentators noted, upon a community.  In the latter case you talk over with others 
what it was that actually worked. 
 
 
Beauty in a Bottle 
 
There are no advertisements which the Balinese I know are more rueful about being 
taken in by than those to do with personal appearance.  Shampoo advertisements were 
the favourite.  Only after buying one or two brands, they said, did it become obvious 
that the models who posed for the ads were chosen for their beautiful hair to begin with!  
The actress, a beautiful woman – but one whose skin was a very slight shade darker 
than that considered attractive – turned to her use of skin whiteners which were much 
promoted during 1997. 
 
Actress: I tried it because the woman in the advertisement was beautiful. 
Ex-head: The one who was using it? 
Actress: The one they used in the ad.  They showed her first and the effect of 
whitener.  To begin with she’s presented as dark, after using whitener, 
she gets whiter, whiter, whiter until she’s white.  After seeing it, why 
not try it out once? I wanted it there and then. 
Self: Did it work? 
Actress: No!  My skin was just the same.   It didn’t get any whiter. 
Self: After that did you try any more? 
Actress: No.  The bottle’s still half full.  I never used it up. 
Self: Did you try another brand? 
Actress: Oh, no! 
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The theme, familiar to Balinese and one to which I shall return in the conclusion, is the 
central role of people’s vanity, which drives them to spend money even if they know it 
is going to be wasted.  As the actress remarked: when she saw the advertisement, she 
wanted the whitening agent instantly.  You rarely buy a line a second time if the first 
was a failure and recommendation by friends displaces the lure of the advertisement. 
 
 
Do Advertisements Force Viewers to Buy? 
 
As the evening wore on and what people had to say was emerging more fully, my 
questioning moved from jogging the conversation along to being more openly 
interrogative.  A common concern in daily life is whether a person was forced into an 
action, a possibility which is strongly disapproved of on the whole.  So I asked what 
seemed to me the obvious question. 
 
Self:  Now it’s like this.  If products are being hyped the whole time, are 
people in some way forced? 
Ex-head: That’s being forced. 
Old Actor: That isn’t being forced.  You can’t call that forced. 
Ex-head: Yes? 
Old Actor: As a person I am not forced by that.  It’s perfectly all right if you have 
some way of showing that it’s useful, so that people are pleased. 
Ex-head: That’s a form of forcing people, what you’ve just said. 
Actress: Now if they just show advertisements again and again, but if I’ve 
bought whatever and it was no good, I’m not going to buy it again.  
But I can enjoy watching the advertisement by itself.  
Old Actor: That isn’t good.  (This sentence could mean several things.  It is 
impossible to tell for sure which.) 
Ex-head: Whatever way you look at it, that means being forced.  (He switches 
to Indonesian.   From the style it would seem a publicly rehearsed 
case against advertisements.) ‘Being coerced by advertisements’.  
(Reverts to Balinese.) You aren’t being forced to buy! It’s not that.  
You’re not forced in that sort of way.  It’s when you don’t, you don’t 
trust something, but you find yourself using the words, talking about 
it, that’s what we’re calling force. 
Actress: Now listen.  It’s not just about people buying.  It’s about not believing 
what you watch.  Now you’ve never bought whatever it is, then you 
think: ‘Well let’s give it a try’. 
Ex-head: That’s it. 
Actress: Because they keep repeating the ads. 
Ex-head:  That’s what we mean by being forced.  It isn’t just one person.  (He 
switches again for the next sentence to Indonesian.)  Many people are 
coerced by advertisements. 
Old Actor: Now, suppose it is just the three, or four, of us, for example.  Now, 
there are advertisements as I see it, Tuan (that is, me).  Now I’m not 
denying that there are all sorts of advertisements, whether they are 
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worth anything or not.  People are only reasonable in – what’s it 
called? – demonstrating what their products can do, using words.  
‘This is what my product is good for’.  Now that’s very useful.  But 
whether that product is any use to you, I have no idea.  I am not 
denying people promote products that way.  But, now, if it were me 
for example who was going to buy it, I would be very careful indeed 
before doing so. 
Actress: You’d be careful buying whatever it is, but you’d just enjoy looking 
at the ad.  Like ‘New.  Durable!’ you can enjoy listening to it.  But 
you don’t feel like buying the product. 
  
As happened often, there was an interesting disagreement.  The ex-headman instantly 
adopted the idea of forcing and a position common in media studies’ work on media 
imperialism.  What matters is the structure within which the viewer is constrained.  By 
contrast, the actress, while recognizing the impact of repetitive exposure to an 
advertisement, brought her own experience to bear.  No amount of repetition will make 
you buy something that does not work.  She also neatly split appreciating the product 
from appreciating the image, the beauty, the cleverness of the advertisement.   
 The old actor instead took a nuanced position, often assumed by wiser 
theatre actors.  Responsibility for action, here purchasing a product because it is heavily 
promoted, lies in the end not with the advertiser or producer, but with the viewer.  
Companies quite reasonably wish to inform the public of their products.  Indeed it is 
useful.  That you should then go and buy the product is something quite different.  That 
depends on the personal exercise of critical judgement.  However much they might wish 
otherwise, advertisers can only partly – and partially – structure the conditions under 
which you have preferences or make choices: they cannot decide for you.  
Philosophically the coercion argument is incoherent on the matter of responsibility and 
so agency.  Interestingly, the old actor parallels Ernesto Laclau (1990) who noted that, 
if decisions are structurally determined, the possibility of the human subject at all is 
eliminated.   
 If you think that I am over-interpreting what Balinese have said and am 
attributing a degree of reflection to their thought which is not warranted, I would beg to 
differ.  That we may not be so reflective is no excuse for projecting, ethnocentrically, 
our habits – indeed prejudices – onto others.  The old actor and ex-headman are both 
traditional intellectuals and quite aware of the complexity of the issues they were 
addressing.  ‘All men’, as Gramsci (1971:9) famously remarked, ‘are intellectuals...but 
not all men have in society the function of intellectuals’.  It may require the 
participation of a trained academic like myself to put the arguments into a format 
acceptable to the dictates of style of late twentieth century academia.  Much of the 
theory is obviously implicit, but then much theory is in academic argument 
(Collingwood 1940; Quine 1953).  We only reveal the tip of a treacherous iceberg.  All 
that says is that ethnography is the product of a complex agent, comprising the 
ethnographer and her interlocutors.  As Collingwood (1940:34) noted, much that passes 
for research is based on the idea that knowledge is: 
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The simple ‘intuition’ of ‘apprehension’ of things confronting us which 
absolutely and in themselves just are what we ‘intuite’ or ‘apprehend’ 
them as being.  This theory of knowledge is called ‘realism’; and 
‘realism’ is based upon the grandest foundation a philosophy can have, 
namely human stupidity. 
 
 
Seduction 
 
As the evening grew late and conversation seemed to be drawing to a close, I asked a 
leading question.  It was bringing  Baudrillard to Bali.21 
 
Self: If I look around for an analogy to the way advertisements coerce, is it 
like seduction?  If a man softens up a woman? 
Ex-head: Now that’s refined coercion.   Seduction.  It fits, it’s seduction. 
Self: What do you think, ‘Gung ‘Kak? 
Old Actor: Now if you say that, if it’s like someone trying to seduce someone 
else, as Ktut said.  I feel it’s right. 
Actress: That kind of forcing isn’t brutal.  It’s subtle force, isn’t it? 
Ex-head: A refined way. 
Old Actor: Now in a refined way, for example.  If everyday people say it too 
often, of course you get a feeling that you want to give it a go.  In 
fact, of course you have to have money.   
  
Whether it emerges in the transcript or not, my suggestion was immediately appealing.  
Young men’s attempts to seduce women, and vice versa, are a favourite theme.  It also 
provided a way out of the dilemma about agency.  The person being seduced has to 
comply, and contributes actively in her or his own seduction (see Hobart 1990).  
Advertisements cannot seduce you unless you collaborate. 
 
 
No Cash, No Desire 
 
The reference to seduction reanimated the whole discussion.  My host’s son had turned 
up and his wife started to tell the story of how he went out one day without telling 
anyone and bought a gas hob, because a poor relative had bought one, whereas he was a 
high school teacher (and moreover had a very good income from the Television 
Project).  His father remarked wryly that his son was caught in the new trap, Géngsi (the 
need for prestige, being one up on the neighbours).  ‘What was he feeling?’, the father 
asked.  His daughter-in-law, the actress, replied: 
 
Actress: He just wanted to buy it. 
Ex-head: Hah! He just wanted it! Now after being desperate to buy it, what if 
you don’t have the money? How do you feel then? 
Actress: If you don’t have the money, then that’s it.  If you don’t have the 
money, you aren’t really going to feel strongly about getting a gas 
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hob.  It’s because he’s got a good job, he had the money to use to buy 
it.  If he hadn’t, he wouldn’t have.  We’d have used the usual 
(paraffin) stove.  There would be no point in wishing for it.  Of course 
he didn’t feel so strongly about it.  The point of the gas hob is that 
because he had the money, he wanted to buy it. 
 
At the end of the previous extract, the old actor had remarked that advertisements made 
you want to try out something, but only if you had the money.  The actress developed 
the point.  If you cannot get hold of the money, you do not want something.  Desire is 
not a primordial condition of human beings (Deleuze & Guattari 1983).  It is the 
product of the relationship between an image, an object, an occasion, an inclination, the 
means and a decision, the willing of an act.  You might fantasize about something, but 
there is no point.  So you do not wish for, or want, it. 
 
 
Drunk on the screen 
 
According to Thatcherism ‘greed is good’.  Capitalism is naturalized by declaring 
economic activity to be based on rational choice, rational choice on egoism and egoism 
on greed.  That the connections do not work well (for example, Hindess 1988:29-41; 
and as the Soeharto régime belatedly found out at the nation’s expense) does not 
prevent them, like  advertisements, from being recycled endlessly.  The old actor’s point 
was that that is no reason to accept the argument. 
 I take it that explanations of complex processes like contemporary 
capitalism, advertising and mass media are underdetermined.  That is, there are several 
explanations which fit the facts, albeit in rather different ways (Quine 1960).  
Additional criteria are required to decide between explanations (Hesse 1978).  
Politicians and economists may be interested in those explanations which make their 
policies or theories look attractive.  As an anthropologist I am interested in explanations 
which avoid ethnocentricity and are commensurable with people’s understanding of the 
conditions of their lives.  I am therefore more interested in accounts that permit people 
critically to reflect on themselves as agents, not just the practices which may tend 
discursively to produce the passive subjects or objects of others’ actions, such as 
advertising. 
 Balinese bring a considerable arsenal of religious and philosophical ideas to 
bear on the explanation of human action.  I shall mention only two, which bear directly 
on advertising.  My sources are from television.  Hinduism is a state-recognized religion 
in Indonesia and most Hindu broadcasts are produced by Balinese.  Understanding the 
earth-shaking economic and social changes taking place, hardly surprisingly, is a 
preoccupation.  As with the old actor’s analysis, the trend is to locate the areas of 
antagonism within the person or between people, rather than displace them onto 
external structures, that objective reality loved of scientism. 
 One of the best known classical frames of reference is the sadripu, the six 
inner enemies, which each human has as part of their being.  These are kama, desire, the 
pleasure of the senses; kroda, anger, passion; loba, greed, covetousness; moha, 
infatuation, darkness of mind, ignorance; mada, intoxication, whether by passion, drink, 
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fury or whatever and matsarya, envy or jealousy (Zoetmulder 1982; Sadripu Téater 
Nusa Denpasar, broadcast February 24, 1993).  Here at last, surely we have greed (and 
desire, for that matter), and a framework which bears at least a passing resemblance to 
the seven deadly sins.  
  Although the sadripu are widely known, they are too general to be applied 
usefully to the critical analysis of human action on specific occasions.  They are 
overshadowed, in religious broadcasting in the nineties at least, by a different 
explanatory grid: the Sapta Timira, the seven forms of benightedness, or intoxication.  It 
is these to which Balinese broadcasters appeal in addressing the problems of the 
contemporary world.22 
 Let me quote from the programme entitled Mada, intoxication (the fifth of 
the sadripu listed above): 
 
Surupa is a person being intoxicated with beauty, or with handsomeness.  
Dana is being overwhelmed by money.  Guna is when someone is 
inebriated with their own abilities.  Cleverness, of course, also 
intoxicates.  Kulina is obsession with status and title.  After that Yowana 
is being infatuated with youth.  Sura is being intoxicated on strong 
liquor, like Pan Suba (a figure in the story) who gets drunk to the point 
of being Sura.  Finally there is Kasuran, that’s getting carried away by 
victory.  So, for example, winning at gambling is also a cause of 
intoxication. 
 
Why so many Balinese feel so ambivalent about the island’s most famous tourist resort, 
Kuta Beach, starts to make sense.  It is the place which best instantiates all seven Timira 
at once on a daily basis. 
 From the excerpts above, it should be clear that, as Balinese talk about 
them, advertising has on the whole far more to do specifically with forms of 
intoxicating than with the other inner enemies.  In different ways, different genres of 
broadcasting address different kinds of intoxication.  The most widely spoken about 
when discussing advertisements is surupa – the intoxication is double.  It is not just 
your own appearance, which impels purchases of shampoo, skin whitener, clothes and 
so on.  More broadly it is intoxication with the attractiveness of the actors in the 
advertisements.23  Obsession with youth is another, if less remarked upon, feature of 
advertisements, as kasuran is in quiz shows and televised sports.   
 I do not wish to force the issue, but Balinese have a wide vocabulary to talk 
about their engagement with television.  This relates to quite distinctive complexes of 
ideas about the nature of the human subject (cf. Wikan 1990).  Indian Samkhya had 
developed an intricate account of the subject and its dispositions as part of a world of 
transformative material processes, the triguna (Larson 1987).  Quite how generally 
Balinese versions of the triguna were used in, say, the precolonial period, by whom and 
on what occasion, I am not in a position to say.  It seems to be the dominant frame of 
reference in Hindu religious broadcasts and is often referred to in theatre.  The theory is 
not just dialogic, but treats humans as continually making and being remade by the 
world about them.  It is an account of the subject which fits post-structuralist 
approaches far better than the atomist theories prevalent for example in psychology. 
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 Advertisements make people drunk.  That is why they feel they must buy 
things suddenly.  The image of intoxication is significant.  It presupposes choice and its 
forfeiture, excess and loss.  There is a recognition of the threat to one’s self-command 
(not self-control, with its mechanistic image of the subject) and the impossibility, in a 
world of transformative process, of total command over oneself anyway.  This account 
of intoxication also presupposes the dangers of a false appreciation of oneself and its 
relation to the world, and a disjuncture between a desired or imagined object and reality.  
It is a relational term, but one that involves rupture and so signals the end of dialogue, 
now replaced by narcissistic monologue (the favoured form of theoretism) or vacuity.  
The primary relation is now to the subject’s own longings.  But this in turn presupposes 
a double other.  The first is the imaginary being who really appreciates your beauty, 
wealth, prowess or whatever.  (In Bali even drunks used to get drunk together in tuak-
drinking groups.)  The second is those others, Peirce’s community, who both appreciate 
its allure – kapetengan is an inevitable part of being a sentient human – and misery; and 
form the conditions of the possibility of recognition of intoxication. 
 Drunkenness in Bali can also be contagious.  Balinese are bitterly aware of 
their proclivity to nuut lubukan, to walk in the footsteps of those who have gone before, 
never veering from what others have done before.  No one even knows the number of 
‘artshops’, homestays and paraphernalia thrown up in an epidemic of Dana across what 
was once, by their own admission, a rather lovely landscape.  There were never 
remotely the customers to justify the riot of intoxication, which was itself cut short by 
the riots across Indonesia as an economy itself built upon intoxication imploded.  Much 
of the development turned out to be a simulation. 
 Put this way it sounds as if intoxication in whatever form is out-and-out bad.  That, 
however, would be to impose a quite different, and puritan, metaphysics upon what 
Balinese are arguing about.24  The point was made nicely by the rich farmer, who turned 
to me one day during a conversation and remarked that he was mad.  To my 
astonishment, the others all chimed in laughing and announced that they were mad too! 
The farmer put me out of my misery by expatiating.  He was mad about bricolage.  He 
was mad about repairing things and messing with odds and ends.  The old actor was 
mad about theatre: it did not matter how old he was, how bad the weather or how far 
away the show, he would be there.  Everyone is mad about something: something 
intoxicates them.  Meditative abstinence is for saints.  And there have never been many 
of those around, not least because so fierce a negation of ordinary mortal frailties sets 
up the likelihood of a correspondingly ferocious reaction into excess.  To be mad or 
drunk may be bad, but it is human.  Anyway those who proclaim their restraint or 
advocate it to others all too often, sadly, turn out later to have indulged in excess 
themselves.  Advertisements simply tap into human frailties. 
   To return to advertising, it is not simply that watching the television screen 
makes you intoxicated by what you see.  A striking feature of advertisements is the 
ecstacy which is supposed to overcome actors when presented with a cold-relief pill, on 
pouring chilli sauce all over your food or given the chance to wear a proprietary 
sanitary pad.  What is distinctive of advertisements as a television genre, perhaps not 
just in Indonesia, is that it is not just the viewers, but the actors too who are drunk on 
the screen.  That it no longer matters that it is a simulation is part of the point of 
advertisements. 
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 Television advertisements are part of a new emerging régime of pleasure.  
Ideas of pleasure, gratification, happiness, and the conditions for their achievement, are 
highly discursively specific (Foucault 1986a, 1986b).  The pleasure theory of human 
drives nicely fits capitalist ideology, because it is linked to an Enlightenment theory of 
the psyche as an internal market to start off with, a model now being displaced by 
consumption as ecstacy (Ferguson 1990; or as Balinese prefer, inebriation).  The 
disciplining discourse which television advertisements aim to impose is connected with 
the imperative of seeking pleasure almost as a moral and civic duty to further 
Indonesian economic development.  As Baudrillard remarked caustically: 
 
The best evidence that pleasure is not the basis of consumption is that 
nowadays pleasure is constrained and institutionalized, not as a right or 
enjoyment, but as the citizen’s duty … The consumer, the modern 
citizen, cannot evade the constraint of happiness and pleasure which in 
the new ethics is equivalent to the traditional constraint of labor and 
production. 
Baudrillard (1988b:46, 48) 
 
And as he has been at pains to make clear, what is consumed are signs of difference, 
driven by a desire for social meaning.  Were it not so, consumers would have long ago 
been sated.  This is why advertisements are as much about consummation as 
consumption. 
 What my Balinese companions had to say about televised advertising 
involves presuppositions broadly similar to those in Baudrillard’s analysis.  They 
continually stressed the overwhelming importance of the image and the need to think 
critically about its relation to the object, which is never fully revealed.  They were also 
quite clear that their moments of enjoyment came about from appreciating the images 
for themselves, an aesthetic consummation.  As they were fairly poor people who could 
not buy most of what they saw, to what extent was this vicarious pleasure or even, as 
mall walking is supposed to be, an act of resistance?  No doubt it is that in part, 
although quite how you tell I do not know.  From what they said, however, it has 
another aspect.  Where the school-teacher was evidently caught up in the civics of 
consumption, the others were articulating the counter-case for a quite different account 
of the subject.  It is a subject placed in a complex dialogue of seduction, excess, 
intoxication and often, by virtue of the human condition, inevitably disappointment.  If 
nothing else, I hope that the analysis of these conversations has made the point that, if 
we imagine our discursive ideas about consumption, pleasure and the human subject are 
universal, we are likely to miss much that is of interest and importance.  There is more 
in heaven and earth than is dreamed of in writing about advertisements and television. 
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Notes 
 
 
                                                          
1 The programme was in Balinese. Words in bold however were in English in the 
original; italicized words are Old Javanese. 
 
2  I have yet to carry out research on the practices of Asian advertising campaigns (such 
as those described by McCreery and Mazzarella in the previous two chapters. However, 
extrapolating from work done elsewhere, I would advance a double ‘null hypothesis’. 
First, the relationship between advertising and sales is sufficiently complex and 
indeterminate that even the crude formula ‘provided it sells the product’ cannot be the 
yardstick for evaluating the efficacy of advertising campaigns (Schudson 1984). 
Second, sales may well be as much about ‘keeping the score’ between rival 
metropolitan advertising companies, whose prime constituency is the world of national 
and transnational media, as it is about the interests of the commercial companies for 
whom they work. 
 
3  Juxtaposing and allowing the intellectual practices of the objects of study to comment 
and reflect on the thinking and practices of their knowing subjects upsets many 
scholars.  The objections take two forms.  The first is that I do not need continually to 
invoke philosophers in order to legitimate what Balinese have to say.  Encouraging a 
normally forbidden, recursive reflection on our own thought is not however primarily 
about justifying Balinese thinking.  It is to question the hegemony of our own thinking 
and decentre it.  It is also to enable the antagonisms (in Laclau’s sense) of different 
congeries of intellectual practices to engage to whatever outcome.  The second 
objection is the inverse of the first.  It is that academic thinking is a priori so superior to 
any native thought that the exercise is inevitably fruitless, inappropriate, indeed 
polluting.  Danny Miller’s response to this chapter was that 1) Balinese had nothing to 
say that was profound and 2) that viewers in other parts of the world can come up with 
parallel ideas.  I leave it to readers to judge the first comment for themselves.  The 
second merely reiterates what I am arguing, namely that academic objectivations of 
people as viewers, masses etc. involves serious misrecognition – indeed denial – of 
what they are doing. 
For some reason, this juxtaposing seems particularly to upset north Americans.  I do not 
know if this is because they still see themselves as the dominant world power and their 
knowledge as correspondingly hegemonic and sacred, whereas we Europeans have 
come sadly to learn that the world all too often exceeds, and fails to conform to, our 
theories.  My own theoretical position here links work in history and philosophy with 
that of Foucault, Baudrillard and the post-Gramscian critiques of Laclau and the cultural 
studies’ debates in Britain. 
 
4  Nor am I reiterating the romantic media studies’ thesis of the active viewing subject, 
who determines her conditions of engagement with the media.  As the Balinese 
commentators made clear, that argument confuses activity and agency.  What this does 
suggest though is that, at least for Indonesia, arguments like Stuart Hall’s about the 
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degree to which mass media are hegemonic are overstated and the familiar product of 
armchair theorizing. 
 
5  This argument obviously echoes critiques of the hegemony of Euro-American science 
by scholars like Haraway (e.g. 1991) and Latour (e.g. 1993).  The difference is that, of 
necessity, they remain part of, and must work within, the ensemble of intellectual 
practices they are criticizing.  The issues of incommensurability and radical translation, 
let alone potentially quite different kinds of intellectual practice are marginal to their 
main concerns. 
 
6  So juxtaposing such practices is merely undoing the original hypostatization by which 
knowledge was made to emerge as a transcendental system in the first place. As the 
Frankfurt Critical School made clear, knowledge is always directed to a purpose, even if 
this purpose is non-technical, but interpretive or emancipatory (Habermas 1978; Apel 
1979). 
 
7 Glossing the title as The Consumer Society significantly puts the stress, as anglo-
saxons prefer, on the individual rather than upon the practice on consumption – thereby 
also missing the double entendre on consummation so central to Baudrillard's analysis. 
 
8  Elsewhere I have considered the problematic relationship of anthropology to cultural 
and media studies (see especially Hobart 1997b). A crucial issue is the relevance and 
kind of ethnography. The present piece is arguing for a shift in degree, if not in the kind, 
of ethnography to incorporate and acknowledge the constitutive dialogue which 
underlies the final inscribed accounts. 
 
9 For this reason I exclude passages from the conversations which would provide 
advertising companies in Indonesia with what viewers consider effective ways of 
overcoming their critical judgement.  Here I echo my Balinese colleagues: advertising 
should inform about the existence and merits of goods and services, but not attempt to 
preempt preference or choice. 
 
10 For a brief account of the television project, see Hobart (1999). 
 
11 The first, which is the one discussed mainly here, was with the elderly men and the 
actress on August 8. The second, on August 17 (National Day), was when I returned to 
the theme after watching television with my host, his son and daughter-in-law and the 
old actor.  Four days later the whole family and some friends were raptly watching a 
film.  So I recorded the advertisements on a VCR and played them back afterwards, 
while recording their comments on a cassette tape. The next day I found the three 
women in the family (great-grandmother, grandmother and daughter) working together 
and asked them about advertisements while they worked and chatted. 
 
12 A problem is that village women are busy, they have little time to break and often 
prefer to talk while they work. On many topics, they were the best commentators. On 
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television they tended to be less so, perhaps because they only really started watching 
after the colour set changed household dynamics. 
 
13 The point has been made forcefully by Johannes Fabian (1990), who has argued 
ethnography to be one performance among the many which are going on at the same 
time.  His argument however still implies inherent dissimulation.  For this reason, I 
prefer Judith Butler's account of performance as simply what there is (Butler 1990, 
1994). 
 
14 Significantly, accounts of identification which have been so central to much film and 
cultural studies did not feature. I spent much time last summer discussing identification 
with actors as well as audiences. It is remarkably hard going actually to formulate 
questions about identity in Balinese. And when you do, you easily land up going round 
in circles. When they finally understood what I was driving at, everyone I spoke to gave 
identification short shrift. 
 
15  Seduction by advertisements (a theme I develop below), as with other embarrassing 
moments, is conventionally supposed to happen to someone else, never to you.  That 
Balinese were enthusiastic to admit to getting carried away has, as I argue towards the 
end of the chapter, with ideas about seduction and intoxication. 
 
16 This sort of sales talk is the butt of popular jokes.  There is apparently a well-known 
sales pitch which is meant to imply that whatever the illness, it will disappear in the 
wink of an eye.  As the patter has come to be condensed, what it literally says is: ‘Rub 
your eyes and your eyes will disappear!’ Conveniently nothing is actually claimed for 
the medicine. 
 
17 The collapse of the rupiah, the implosion of the Indonesian economy after May 1998 
and the decline of the tourist trade have tended to prove my host right in his decision to 
forego lavish spending and buy rice land when everyone else was in an orgy of selling 
theirs.  Once, of course, rich consumers had made their money work or they would not 
be as rich as they are. 
 
18 On the applicability of dialogic analyses to the study of Bali, see Hobart (2000). The 
choice is between what you can make of the sort of thing the commentators were 
discussing above as against the finding, say, that 92 per cent of young people between 
sixteen and twenty years of age from a particular Asian country said that they did not 
respect politicians.  (This, as near as I can remember it from a lecture during the original 
conference in Hong Kong, is the percentage who asserted this wholly unremarkable 
pseudo-fact during interviews made under unknown, but doubtless ‘carefully controlled, 
objective’ circumstances.) 
 
19 It does not follow, as some participants at the original ConsumAsiaN workshop on 
‘Asian Advertising and Media’ took it, that the commentators were arguing that the 
product is seen as no more than an image. That is a classical problem of European 
representationism. Quite the contrary, the problem to Balinese is that people easily 
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conflate image and object and confuse the complex relationship between them.  Unless 
you happen to bump into something, most of what you encounter happens to be images. 
The formal philosophical issues have been laid at some length in Nyaya-Vaisesika (see 
Potter 1977; for the problems of its applicability to Bali, see Hobart 1985). 
 
20 Incidentally, if I – by way of the commentators – appear to be taking issue with 
Baudrillard in particular, it is largely because he actually said something interesting and 
worth engaging with. 
 
21 He is in vogue in the Faculty of Arts at the provincial state university.  I must confess 
I am partly, but by no means wholly, responsible for this through my work on media 
studies in Indonesia. The excitement he generates there is interesting. 
 
22 Inevitably perhaps accounts vary, primarily over whether bravery or concern with 
winning should be separated from kasaktian, unusual efficacy (conventionally glossed 
as ‘mystical power’).  Other programmes in the Hindu Religious Rostrum series of 
broadcasts make it clear that timira, kapetengan, or kagelapan all signify intoxication, 
kamabukan, for example Karma wesana broadcast November 3, 1993; Peteng pitu 
broadcast September 21, 1994: ‘The seven forms of benightedness or sapta timira are 
seven kinds of darkness or seven kinds of drunkenness’ (Peteng pitu atau sapta timira 
adalah tujuh macam kegelapan atau tujuh jenis kemabukan). 
 
23  Balinese are often quite open about their sexual attraction to television actors . 
 
24  This is not to say that some people do not subscribe to anti-recidivism, even 
encratism, for example the producers of some Hindu religious broadcasts. To what 
extent this is a reaction among public presenters of all the major religions in Indonesia 
against the conspicuous excess of the last years, and to what extent a more specifically 
Hindu-Buddhist response to the preachings of the more puritanical schools of Islam, is 
an interesting question. 
